

Statutory Constraint and State Supreme Courts: A Test of the Contingent Attitudinal Model

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Abstract

Are state supreme court judges influenced by the *contingent attitudinal model*, similar to their federal colleagues? Stated another way, do these judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or are they constrained by the language of state statutes? Using data from the Judge Level State Supreme Court Database, we analyze the votes of individual judges in 1995 to determine whether their behavior is constrained by legislation. Our results indicate that more detailed language (resulting in statutes with higher word counts) significantly limits the discretion afforded to liberal judges while simultaneously facilitating the ideological voting of their conservative colleagues. These results suggest a theoretically important way of thinking about judicial behavior. Rather than conceptualizing the legal model and the attitudinal model as competitors, the empirical evidence suggests that legal influences and ideological influences also work in tandem in among state supreme courts. These judges are influenced by the *contingent attitudinal model* and, occasionally, the traditional tension exists and statutory language constrains the judges from voting ideologically. However, in other instances these two influences operate in a more dynamic and interdependent manner and we observe statutory language facilitating the expression of ideological voting among the judges.

In 2004 the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the state legislature could not ban homosexual marriage.¹ Opponents of this decision claimed that the state judges had “made up” the law, usurping the authority of state lawmakers. This debate prompted other states to craft new statutes (similar to the federal Defense of Marriage Act) or pass amendments to state constitutions that defined marriage in specific ways. These actions, however, beg the question whether new legislation will “keep judges in check”. If judges “make up” the law according to their ideological preferences, then the development of additional legislation will not substantially alter judicial behavior. Yet, if judges adhere to the language of statutes then state legislatures possess an ability to significantly constrain judicial decision making.

In this paper we address whether state supreme court judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or whether the language of state statutes constrain their behavior. In so doing, we extend previous research on statutory constraint of federal appellate judges (Randazzo, Waterman, and Fine 2006) and Supreme Court justices (Randazzo and Waterman 2006) to the state level. These analyses discovered that the decision calculus of federal judges is contingent upon the language of Congressional statutes – judges are able to render decisions according to their ideological preferences when federal statutes provide discretion. Yet, when judges encounter more detailed statutes, which proscribe specific outcomes, judicial behavior is significantly constrained. Thus, the ability of federal appellate judges and Supreme Court justices to rule attitudinally is contingent upon the level of statutory constraint.

We build upon this research by examining whether state supreme court judges are influenced by the *contingent attitudinal model*, similar to their federal colleagues. Do these judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or are they constrained by the

¹ *Opinions of the Justices to the Senate*. 2004. 802 N.E. 2d 565.

language of state statutes? Extending this research to the state level allows us to determine whether various institutional differences among the states, such as method of judicial selection, significantly affect judicial behavior.

THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL VERSUS THE LEGAL MODEL

One of the most widely accepted theories of judicial decision making posits that judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or attitudes. Initially argued by Pritchett (1948) during his examination of the Roosevelt Court, the model was best articulated in the book by Segal and Spaeth (1993; 2002). Yet, critics of the attitudinal model claim that the empirical support favoring ideological influences were is limited because scientific tests of the legal model were not employed (see Brisbin 1996). Consequently, since the “legal model is too crippled to show up at the field, the attitudinal model wins by forfeit” (Canon 1993).

One of the primary reasons for the dominance of the attitudinal model over the legal model involves the availability of empirical measures for each concept. Several robust measures of ideological preferences exist for all levels of the judiciary in the United States (see Segal and Cover 1989; Brace, Hall and Langer 2000; Giles, Hettinger and Peppers 2001; and Martin and Quinn 2002). Unfortunately, a concurrent development of legal measures has not occurred and therefore “few studies have been undertaken by empirically oriented scholars to examine the effects of traditional legal concepts on case outcomes or judicial votes” (Songer and Haire 1992, 979). In part, this lack of empirical analysis on legal influences arises because of the difficulty inherent in measuring concepts such as plain meaning, legislative intent, and precedent. Some scholars rely on strategies which examine progeny cases from landmark decisions (Songer and Sheehan 1990; Knight and Epstein 1996; Segal and Spaeth 1996; Songer and Lindquist 1996).

Other scholars employ a series of dummy variables to capture the presence or absence of specific case facts or legal doctrine (Segal 1984; George and Epstein 1992; Songer and Haire 1992; Songer, Segal and Cameron 1994). We argue that a more continuous measure, grounded within an applicable theoretical framework, is essential to understanding the potential legal constraints judges encounter when adjudicating disputes.

Furthermore, the lack of suitable empirical measures has substantially hindered the development rich theoretical models which account for both ideological and legal influences on judicial behavior. Many analyses simply assume that a tradeoff exists between ideology and legal influences (Rowland and Carp 1980) and, therefore, legal factors are relegated to control variables with ideological measures representing the primary variables of interest. Consequently, our understanding of the potentially dynamic interplay between ideological and legal influences has not fully developed.

Recently, however, scholars have refocused their attention with regard to the influence of legal factors. A growing number of empirical studies demonstrate the dynamic influence of legal factors. For example, Richards and Kritzer (2003) demonstrate the importance of jurisprudential regimes and Hansford and Spriggs (2006) provide a detailed examination of the effects of precedent. These studies point the way toward a more robust theory of judicial decision making and offer new measures of legal influences. However, as with the initial development of the attitudinal model, these recent studies have focused exclusively upon the Supreme Court. More robust models of legal factors and ideological influences are needed at other levels of the judiciary. This paper therefore makes two important contributions. First, it continues recent efforts at providing more suitable measures of legal influences and offering a more dynamic theoretical model of the interplay between law and ideology. Second, it conducts the analysis at

the state supreme court level, thereby building upon the previous research on state courts conducted by several eminent scholars such as Glick (1991), Emmert (1992), Brace and Hall (1995; 1997) and Langer (2002).

THE CONTINGENT ATTITUDINAL MODEL

The well articulated argument by Segal and Spaeth (1993; 2002) provides convincing evidence that judges (in particular Supreme Court justices) render decisions according to their individual ideological preferences, *ceteris paribus*. Yet, we are less certain about the impact of these ideological influences when other factors are not equal. Various legal considerations such as precedent, case facts, the plain meaning of the law, and legislative intent may affect the ability of judges to rule ideologically. Stated another way, the impact of ideology on judicial behavior may be *contingent* on the degree of legal discretion afforded judges.

We argue that the laws passed by legislatures may condition the degree to which judges can rely on their individual ideological preferences when adjudicating disputes. As Huber and Shipan (2002, 76) discover, “Legislative statutes are blueprints for policymaking. In some cases, legislatures provide very detailed blueprints that allow little room for other actors... to create policy on their own. In other cases, legislatures take a different approach and write statutes that provide only the broad outlines of policy, which gives bureaucrats [and judges] the opportunity to design and implement policy.” Clearly, judges are not the same as bureaucrats, whose role is to administer or implement the law. Bureaucrats do not have the authority to determine which laws are constitutional, nor can they strike down specific provisions within statutes. Yet, the key concept captured by Huber and Shipan is the *level of discretion* provided by legislation.

Therefore, the ability of judges to decide cases attitudinally is *contingent* upon the level of detail and the level of discretion included in statutes.

At the federal level, Randazzo, Waterman, and Fine (2006) found that appeals court judges were constrained by more specific federal statutes. In particular, liberal judges were less likely to render liberal decisions in criminal cases. Likewise, conservative judges were constrained in civil liberties cases involving issues related to discrimination. Additionally, Randazzo and Waterman (2006, 19) discovered a more dynamic relationship among justices of the Supreme Court; “even when the justices are influenced by their ideological preferences, the law can facilitate the expression of ideological voting among some justices while also constraining ideological voting among others.” Thus, the contingent effect can operate in two ways – it can constrain judges from voting according to their ideological preferences or it can facilitate the influence of ideology. Intuitively, this argument seems extremely plausible. If a legislature passes a broad statute with ambiguous language to proscribe policy outcomes, then one would expect judges to interpret that statute based on their ideological preferences. Yet, if that legislature passes a detailed statute which proscribes a conservative outcome one would expect liberal judges who subsequently interpret that statute to be constrained from voting in a liberal fashion, whereas conservative judges could rely on the same statutory language to facilitate their conservative votes (and vice versa). This *contingent attitudinal model* is therefore dynamic in the sense that some judges may encounter statutory language that constrains their behavior while others are facilitated to rule ideologically.

To measure this influence, and examine the effects of statutory constraint on the *contingent attitudinal model*, we borrow from the research of Huber, Shipan and Pfahler (2001)

and Huber and Shipan (2002). In their analyses of statutory constraint on bureaucratic behavior they rely on a proxy measure based on the length of the statute. As they indicate,

Our qualitative and quantitative investigation of a huge number of statutes suggests that the more words a legislature puts into legislation on the same issue, the more it constrains other actors who will implement policy on that issue. Similarly, the fewer words it writes, the more discretion it gives to other actors (2002, 73).

After conducting a series of validity tests on this measure for Medicaid statutes, their analyses reveal that the length of statutes successfully accounts for variation caused by differences among (1) fairly meaningless generalizations, (2) situations where legislators deliberately pass vague consensus statutes, and (3) instances where legislators move beyond mere platitudes to enact statutes containing specific details designed to affect implementation and interpretation.

In a similar vein, Randazzo, Waterman and Fine (2006) conducted a series of validity tests to determine whether longer statutes contained more detailed language that might limit the discretion of judges. For each issue area they content analyzed a sample of statutes: some with shorter word lengths, some with lengths near the overall mean for that issue, and some with longer word lengths. They discovered that statutes with higher word counts contained more references to previous legislation or court decisions, along with more detailed descriptions of how these statutes and decisions relate to particular intended outcomes or interpretations. For example, the statutes 21 USC 846 and 18 USC 2510 describe particular criminal activities, but do so with different degrees of specificity. The former contains 246 sections and over 300,000 words, while the latter contains 26 sections with approximately 26,000 words. This variation in overall length and number of sections directly affects the degree of detail included in the statute. Each contains references to other statutes and previous court cases (to help provide contextual information to the interpreter), though the number of references is vastly different between the

two statutes. While 18 USC 2510 includes 346 references to court cases, 21 USC 846 contains approximately 2,500 references to court cases. Additionally, both statutes provide descriptions of the various activities deemed criminal by Congress and definitions of various technical terms; yet, the descriptions and definitions included in 21 USC 846 are substantially more complete and thorough than those in 18 USC 2510. Consequently, the reader has a better understanding of the intent of Congress (including the desired outcomes of the legislators) in the former statute than the latter.

The question we address in this paper is whether the language include in state statutes has a similar effect on the behavior of state supreme court judges. If the *contingent attitudinal model* influences these judges, then we expect similar patterns of constraint and facilitation to occur. Yet, it is possible that the institutional variations among state courts (such as the method of judicial selection) limit an application of the *contingent attitudinal model* to the state level. Furthermore, we recognize that state judges may be called upon to examine only a specific section of the statute rather than the entire law. However, it is difficult to determine with certainty whether these judges also reference the remaining portions of the bill in order to obtain contextual information on the intended effect or purpose of the legislation. If the judges examine other portions, then relying on the overall word count of the statute as a measure of constraint does not systematically bias the analysis. Yet, if the judges only examine the specific section under dispute, then our inclusion of the overall word count poses a higher threshold for determining a statistically significant relationship.

Under this more stringent test, if state supreme court judges are affected by the *contingent attitudinal model* and the language of statutes, we expect more ambiguous laws to provide them with more discretion to set policy according to their individual ideological

preferences. Conversely, statutes containing more detailed language will constrain the judges from casting ideological votes. This leads to our primary hypothesis:

If the contingent attitudinal model affects state court behavior, as statutory constraint increases we expect state judges to have less discretion to vote ideologically.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data for this study come from the Judge Level State Supreme Court Database archived at Rice University. Though the data contain cases from 1995 through 1998, our initial examination only includes cases from 1995. We examined each case in the dataset to determine whether the state courts interpreted a state statute, and subsequently confined our analysis to those cases. This yields approximately 44,000 individual state judge votes in 1995.

The dependent variable for the analysis is whether a state judge voted in an unconstrained or sincere manner.² We code the variable ‘1’ if a liberal judge casts a liberal vote and ‘0’ if that judge votes conservatively.³ Similarly, the variable is coded ‘1’ if a conservative judge votes conservatively and ‘0’ if that judge casts a liberal vote. We also note that in the construction of the dataset we eliminate those cases where a clear ideological decision does not exist. This reduces the initial number of observations to approximately 23,000.⁴

Theoretically, our independent variable of primary interest is *Statutory Constraint*. Following the Huber and Shipan methodology, we examine the length of state statutes. To measure the length we recoded every state court decision which included an interpretation of a

² Since we are not testing a strategic model, we hesitate to use the term sincere. However, this is the most straightforward connotation to determine the influence of ideology and constraint.

³ We rely on the Brace, Hall and Langer (2000) measure of ideology to determine whether a judge is considered ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’.

⁴ Since we examine subsets of cases, the total number of observations in each statistical model will fluctuate.

legislative statute, using Lexis-Nexis and the ‘word count’ feature in the web browser Firefox. While this strategy provides a raw count of the number of words per statute, there are important reasons why the raw number is not useful in an empirical model. Theoretically, we expect the impact of statutory constraint to possess diminishing marginal returns. For example, while increasing the length of a statute from 1000 to 2000 words dramatically reduces the ambiguity of that particular law, a similar increase to a statute containing 100,000 words will have a more muted effect on the influence of judicial discretion. Furthermore, from a methodological standpoint using the raw number of words is problematic both because of the inherent noise associated with a raw count and the considerable skewness in the measure.⁵ Consequently, because we are interested in constraint brought by substantial differences among statutes, it is reasonable to take the natural log of each statute as our operationalization of the variable *Statutory Constraint*. Taking the natural log allows us to minimize the noise associated with raw counts and reduce the variable’s skewness, while preserving the expected theoretical relationship. According to our hypothesis, since we expect statutory constraint to decrease the likelihood of ideological voting, this variable should possess a negative relationship with the probability of a sincere vote.

To measure the ideological influences of the *contingent attitudinal model*, we rely on the PAJID scores developed by Brace, Hall, and Langer (2000). These scores place state court judges on an ideological continuum from most conservative (with a score of 0) to most liberal (with a score of 100). Because our theory argues that statutory constraint will limit ideological influences over judicial behavior, regardless of the directionality of those ideological influences, we ‘fold’ the PAJID scores into a continuum from the most moderate judges to the most extreme

⁵ Examination of the descriptive statistics associated with the word count reveals that the mean number of words per statute equals 16,087 with a standard deviation of 30,730; and a minimum of 173 and maximum of 322,117 words.

ideologues.⁶ Consequently, we hypothesize that judges with stronger ideological preferences will be more likely to render unconstrained or sincere decisions. A positive relationship should therefore exist between our variable *Ideological Intensity* and the dependent variable.

In addition to the two primary variables of interest, our model includes three other control variables – one measured at the individual case level and the remaining two measured at the state level. The first measures whether the state court is requested to review the constitutionality of a statute. If the courts exercise the power of *Judicial Review*, we expect the judges to be more likely to cast sincere votes (i.e., we do not expect substantial constraint to exist when the constitutionality of the statute is questioned). Therefore, a positive relationship should exist between this variable and the dependent variable. Additionally, at the state level we control for the general ideology of each state in the variable *State Ideology*. We rely on the measure developed by Berry et al., which estimates the ideology score for each congressional district within a state based upon electoral partisan cleavages, and aggregates to a single score for the state (on a continuum from most conservative to most liberal). Finally, the variable *Selection Method* controls for the selection method used to determine individuals for the state bench. This is an ordinal variable that measures whether judges achieve positions through gubernatorial appointment (coded ‘1’), legislative appointment (coded ‘2’), retention elections (coded ‘3’), non-partisan direct elections (coded ‘4’), or partisan elections (coded ‘5’). Several previous studies of state court behavior demonstrate the different behavioral patterns exhibited by judges who are directly elected to the bench versus their appointed colleagues (see Hall 1992; Brace, Hall, and Langer 2001).

⁶ The folding is accomplished by subtracting 50 from the PAJID score for each individual judge and taking the absolute value of that result.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Because our data represent individual choices nested within state-level influences, we employ a multilevel model to examine the effects of the *contingent attitudinal model* on state court judges. In so doing, we rely on a Bernoulli sampling specification with an accompanying logit link to examine the binary dependent variable. We initially define the logit link, $\Pr(Y_{ij} = 1) = \rho_{ij}$, which is the probability of a sincere vote for judge i in state j . We then define γ_{ij} as the log-odds of ρ_{ij} (i.e., $\gamma_{ij} = \log[\rho_{ij} / 1 - \rho_{ij}]$), which allows us to specify the log-odds as a linear function of the level 1 independent variables. This equation is then conditioned on the level 2 macro (i.e. state-level) effects. Therefore, the overall model estimates a two-level random coefficient model with the following specification:

(Level-1): $\gamma_{ij} = \beta_{0ij} + \beta_{1ij} \textit{Statutory Constraint} + \beta_{2ij} \textit{Ideological Intensity} + \beta_{3ij} \textit{Judicial Review}$

(Level-2): $\beta_{0j} = \pi_{0j} + \pi_{1j} \textit{State Ideology} + \pi_{2j} \textit{Selection Method}$

In the Level 1 equation, the likelihood of a sincere vote (γ_{ij}) for any individual judge is associated with the degree of statutory constraint, the strength of the judge's ideological preferences, and whether the case involves an aspect of judicial review. β_{0ij} is a random intercept that varies across individual judges and states, and it can be conceptualized as the general propensity of a sincere vote. Furthermore, the Level 1 equation is also affected by differences among states (j). The term π_{0j} is a random intercept that represents the general propensity for state j to experience sincere votes among its judges. Additionally, the Level 2 effects are also conditioned by state ideology and the selection mechanism used to determine its judges. To estimate the effects of this multilevel model, we employ the XTMELOGIT routine contained within STATA 10.0; the results of which are presented in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 Here

Examining the results in Table 1 reveals that the *contingent attitudinal model* significantly influences state supreme court judges. For liberal judges (Model 1), the language of state statutes significantly constrains the likelihood of a sincere vote – the variable *Statutory Constraint* is significant and negative. Conversely, conservative judges (Model 2) experience a significant degree of facilitation; the likelihood of a sincere vote significantly increases in the presence of more detailed legislation. Furthermore, in neither model is the coefficient for *Ideological Intensity* statistically significant. Therefore, these results indicate that the impact of ideological influences on state court behavior is substantially curtailed once one controls for the presence of statutory constraint. Additionally, the results in Table 1 indicate that conservative judges are significantly more likely to cast sincere votes when they are reviewing the constitutionality of a statute – the variable *Judicial Review* is significant and positive. Finally, the variable *Selection Method* is statistically significant (and positive) only for conservative judges – indicating that judges who are directly elected to office are more likely to cast sincere votes than their appointed colleagues.

These results provide initial support for our hypothesis related to the *contingent attitudinal model*. Yet, the statistical coefficients of the multilevel model do not provide insight into the substantive effects of statutory constraint on judicial behavior. To examine these substantive implications, we graphed the relationships among statutory constraint, individual ideological preferences and the probability of casting a sincere vote.⁷

⁷ The graphs are constructed holding all other influences (i.e., variables in the statistical model) constant.

Insert Figure 1 Here

Figure 1 presents these influences on the probability of a sincere vote for state court judges. Examining the graph reveals that individual ideology plays a limited role among state judges.⁸ Conversely, the effects of statutory constraint display a prominent influence on the probability of a sincere vote. As the length of legislation increases, the probability of liberal judges casting sincere votes decreases from approximately .400 to approximately .250. In contrast, the probability of conservative judges casting sincere votes increases from approximately .500 to approximately .850. This finding raises the question as to why the *contingent attitudinal model* would constrain liberal judges from casting sincere votes while simultaneously facilitating the sincere voting patterns of their conservative colleagues. It is likely that this phenomenon is the result of the nature of the cases in our sample. A brief examination of the various issue areas included in the analysis reveals that approximately 75% of the cases involve disputes against the government – either criminal appeals or civil cases against the state. We speculate that the majority of statutes pertaining to governmental authority proscribe conservative outcomes. If this speculation is accurate, then it is not surprising to discover significant constraint experienced by liberal judges and significant facilitation of conservatives. Certainly, additional research is necessary to determine more precisely the primary explanation for our results. Yet, our initial analysis provides empirical support for the influence of the *contingent attitudinal model* on the behavior of state court judges.

The combined findings for *Statutory Constraint* and *Individual Ideology* suggest a theoretically important way of thinking about judicial behavior. Rather than conceptualizing the

⁸ For graphical purposes we “unfold” the PAJID measure of ideology. Consequently, the axis labeled IDEOLOGY represents the entire ideological continuum, with scores ranging from the most extreme conservative judges to the most extreme liberal judges.

legal model and the attitudinal model as competitors (i.e., that there is a tradeoff between constraint and ideology), the empirical evidence suggests that legal influences and ideological influences also work in tandem in among state supreme courts. These judges are influenced by the *contingent attitudinal model* and, occasionally, the traditional tension exists and statutory language constrains the judges from voting ideologically. However, in other instances these two influences operate in a more dynamic and interdependent manner and we observe statutory language facilitating the expression of ideological voting among the judges.

CONCLUSIONS

Are state supreme court judges influenced by the *contingent attitudinal model*, similar to their federal colleagues? Stated another way, do these judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or are they constrained by the language of state statutes? Our initial examination into this question provides empirical evidence to support this contention. The measure of statutory constraint reveals that more detailed language (resulting in statutes with higher word counts) significantly limits the discretion afforded to liberal judges while simultaneously facilitating the ideological voting of their conservative colleagues.

Our analysis provides initial empirical evidence to support a new theoretical conceptualization of judicial behavior – based on the *contingent attitudinal model*. If everything else is held equal, judges may render decisions according to their ideological preferences. Yet, all things are not equal and the presence of legal factors, such as statutory constraint, limits the ability of some judges to rule ideologically. However, the story does not end here. The presence of detailed statutory language can also facilitate the expression of ideological voting among other judges. Thus, while some individuals experience significant constraint from the presence of

detailed statutory language, others experience an enhancement of their ideological preferences and are more likely to vote in a sincere manner. Based on this dynamic interaction between political attitudes and statutory influences, one should not think of the legal model only as a set of forces that operates in contrast to ideological attitudes. Our conceptualization of the *contingent attitudinal model* consequently provides a more complete model of judicial decision making which accounts for the dynamic interaction of political preferences and statutory influences.

While these results suggest an important new theoretical direction for judicial behavior, the research also raises additional questions for future studies to address. First, why are the state level effects not more prominent in the model – in particular the method of judicial selection? An initial answer to this question may involve the nature of state legislation. A preliminary ‘post-analysis’ reveals that states which directly elect their supreme court judges are significantly more likely to pass lengthier legislation.⁹ It is possible that this is a result of state legislatures attempting to make directly elected supreme court judges more accountable to politicians than to the public at large. Yet, more research is needed to determine the precise nature of this relationship. Second, additional research is needed to determine whether these initial results are confined to 1995 or whether they can be generalized to a broader context. Empirically examining these questions in future research is important to determine additional aspects of the dynamic and interdependent relationship between statutory influences and ideological preferences.

⁹ A simple bivariate regression reveals a significant relationship between *Judicial Selection* and *Statutory Constraint*.

TABLE 1: MULTILEVEL MODEL OF STATUTORY CONSTRAINT


	Model 1 Liberal Judges	Model 2 Conservative Judges
<i>Individual Level Effects (Level 1)</i>		
Statutory Constraint	-.158*** (.019)	.161*** (.014)
Ideological Intensity	-.004 (.003)	.002 (.001)
Judicial Review	-.146 (.093)	.231** (.079)
Constant	1.171 (.181)	-1.139 (.143)
<i>State Level Effects (Level 2)</i>		
State Ideology	.208 (.124)	.000 (.349)
Selection Method	.002 (.142)	.063* (.029)
Constant	.298 (.079)	.305 (.062)
N	7109	10887
Log-Likelihood	-4734.316	-7258.277
Wald χ^2	71.67	126.61
Probability > χ^2	.000	.000
LR Test (State Level Effects) χ^2	171.17	233.77
Probability > χ^2	.000	.000

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001

Dependent Variable: unconstrained or sincere vote (1), constrained vote (0)

Note: estimates calculated using XTMELOGIT command in STATA 10.0

FIGURE 1: SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS OF STATUTORY CONSTRAINT



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